INTRODUCTION
Cities are highly permanent artifacts, the most tangible of all human creations. Their infrastructure and built structures are slow and costly to produced, with lifetimes of indefinite extent. So, urban planning aims in principle to provide a long term futures perspective based on strategic policy intelligence. But the reality is often different: urban planning is hindered by lack of evidence, lack of financial power, political pressures and disconnection of citizens from government. This suggests an essential role for a city-level foresight process, not just as a one-off futures study, but embedded into urban policy and urban institutions. A successful foresight would build capacity for social learning and collective intelligence, and anticipatory governance, but again the reality is lacking and good examples are short-lived.
At this moment, however, there are developments in governance and informatics, and these could offer potential for real progress in the UK and similar countries. This paper aims to respond with a theoretical framework and practical examples. It addresses three main questions in three main (Loveridge, 2009) . While in principle this seems logical, in practical application to cities it seems there are many barriers. Cities aren't generally freestanding units: they are more like hubs in a network, pulled by global forces of finance or technology, and strategic planning with foresight often runs into vested interests (Fernandez-Guell and Redondo, 2012) .
One way forward is with a co-evolutionary approach, which explores the potential for system change and transformation, and this can use a set of methods and tools known as 'synergistics' (Ravetz, 2015) . As in the next section, this identifies three levels or framings of complexity and coevolutionary change. In summary, there's a 'linear' (1.0) model of foresight, with a deterministic frame. An 'evolutionary' (2.0) model of foresight is more focused on adaptive innovation . By contrast is a 'co-evolutionary' 3.0 model of 'Synergy-Foresight': focused on co-learning, co-creation and co-intelligence, not only within the foresight programme, but across the wider city and its economies, governances and technologies (Mulgan, 2014 : Cohen, 2012 : Ravetz, 2013 .
This three-level model can be seen in many applications. For example, in the housing retrofit case in Section 4, a 'linear' model is about numbers of units: an evolutionary model is more about incentives and markets: and the 'co-evolutionary' model is about the cognitive-collaborative community of actors in retrofit. The next step is to map this three-layer model onto different domains: the foresight 'subject' (the persons or agents involved): the foresight 'object' (the agenda or object of enquiry): and the foresight 'processes' (methods, tools, programs etc). In each, there are visible contrasts between 'linear' or 'evolutionary', and a more 'co-evolutionary' frame and way of thinking.
A key component of foresight is the 'vision thing'. Values and priorities, aspirations and ambitions, 'success scenarios' and similar, are each facets of a 'normative future' (Bezold, 2013) . If policy was a simple thing it would translate the visions into tangible goals, objectives, targets, road-maps and strategies. In reality nothing is simple, and a typical foresight exercise often sees both visions and F o r e s i g h t
MAPPING FORESIGHT
Here we look at the principles of foresight as a means of transformation, and apply them to the main components of 'subject, process and object'. In each of these it's clear that there is some kind of transformation effect from the foresight process: but in practice this is often not visible or explicit.
For instance, if we run a foresight on urban housing, detailed questions on housing numbers are often entangled with ethics or issues of political economy: complex collaborations between producers intermediaries or users, or the linkages of housing with other fields, are not easy to separate out.
Our experience suggests that if foresight is, (a) more effective in its own terms, and (b) more useful for its wider purpose in building 'strategic urban co-intelligence', we should explore the meaning of such transformations. To do this we introduce the co-evolutionary approach and the methods of 'synergistic mapping and design', in a brief overview of issues covered in other papers (Ravetz 2013 : Miles 2012 .
Co-evolutionary systems & synergistic thinking
F o r e s i g h t These insights came in parallel with early systems thinking, which tended to look for discreet variables, relationships, and feedbacks: where these are formalized, then a 'viable systems' or system dynamics model can be constructed [Beer, 1966 : Meadows, 2008 : Bar-Yam, 1997 ). However many human-centred systems are shaped by more qualitative intangible factors, where more heuristic or actor-centred approaches are more relevant, such as Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland & Scholes, 1990) . More recently systems thinking and system dynamic modelling has been applied to concepts of sustainability and 'adaptive systems', in 'Viable Systems Models', in ecological modeling, or similar agendas on sustainability (Espinosa and Walker, 2011 : Folke et al 2002 : Waltner-Toews, 2009 : Clayton and Radcliffe, 1996 . A "functional adaptive system" is based on a simple feedback-response loop, such as a thermostat which regulates a boiler, as described in system dynamics. A 'complex adaptive system' can be seen with self-regulating socio-ecological or similar relational communities, with features such as emergence, self-organization, non-linearity, and co-evolution (Holland, 1998 : Buckley, 1998 : Brand, 2005 . A further level can be framed as a 'complex cognitive system': human-centred systems driven by conscious and strategic intentions, such as policy discourse, learning effects, creative enterprise, cultural reproduction, or generally the co-evolution of co-intelligence (Yang & Shan, 2008) , or 'co-intelligence' (Mulgan 2013 : Atlee, 2003 .
Beyond the frame of 'socio-ecological' or 'socio-technical' systems (Geels, 2004) , the synergistic approach includes for wider "socio-technical-economic-environment-political-value' systems, in other words the 'STEEPV' scheme used in many kinds of foresight work (Loveridge, 2009 ) (here the variation of 'STEEPC' is used to include 'culture'). In parallel the 'post-normal science' concept responds to uncertainty and controversy in knowledge production and application, and the interaction between knowledge and human 'values' (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1994) . Various interpretations of this run in parallel, such as the concept of 'problematic knowledge' (Leach et al, 2010) : and uncertainty and scientific quality (van der Sluijs et al 2010).
Co-evolution in 1-2-3
These perspectives -systems, complexity, learning, problematic knowledge, and so on -are brought together as a combination of theory and practice, framed as 'synergistic thinking' (Ravetz, 2014) . The first application of this is to identify and map co-evolutionary change, with different levels or conceptual models of system dynamics and structure. Three main types of model are apparent, labeled here as "1-2-3.0": 1) 1.0: linear model: 'functional systems' which respond to direct short term change: (i.e. an image of a large and complicated machine). If urban transport is framed as a machine run Page 6 of 38 Foresight   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  e  s  i  g  h  t on command and control lines, it cannot evolve into anything different, although it may be complicated and 'clever'.
2) 2.0: evolutionary model: 'complex adaptive systems', with longer term changes and transitions, with a biological image of 'survival of the fittest' in the jungle. Urban transport here is framed as an evolutionary socio-technical system of adaptation and innovation, successful for some and failing others, with autonomous evolution as a 'smart' city.
3) 3.0: co-evolutionary model: 'complex cognitive systems', shaped by human qualities of colearning, cognition, co-creation and co-production, with a societal image of a civilization. An urban transport can be framed as not only technology and markets, but wider combinations of cultural, social, emotional and ethical values and synergies, as part of a 'wise' city.
The 3.0 model can then be applied to many different domains -e.g. social, technical, economic, environmental, political, culturaland so on (a list summarized here as 'STEEPCU'). The vital factor is the forming of synergies of all kinds, within each domain and between them, and so the model as a whole is framed as 'synergistic'.
Boundary questions and tensions
Scenario methods are often framed as a simple checklist of 4, 6, 8 or 10 steps (Strategy Unit, 2001 : Ringland, 2006 : Eerola and Miles, 2011 . But practitioners know them more as an art form, needing skilled facilitation and rapport with participants. While participants often struggle with ambiguity and confusion, experienced facilitators know to jump over tricky issues in order to get an output. But some common questions tend to go round and round:
• "how do we know what is outside or inside the 'boundary' of the problem or solution?
• "how do we know what is a driver of change, whether immediate cause, threshold trigger, or an underlying shift, when they are all inter-connected?
• "how can we discuss a major transformation if we have no idea how to achieve it?" Each of these suggests that the reality of exploring the future is often more 'synergistic' than the simple guidance would suggest. For instance, in the textbooks the 'system boundary' and 'policy boundary' are clear and distinct, but in practice questions arise between the 'drivers of change', 'responses to drivers', 'drivers of responses' and so on. Recent scenario methods are more open to multiple realities, for instance Causal Layer Analysis, and the 'Policy Framework' approach to future- 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  e  s  i  g  h  t oriented policy knowledge (Inayatullah, 2011 : Miedzinski, 2015 . One example was the UK program of scenario workshops on a 'One Planet' sustainability agenda (Ravetz, 2006) . This brought to the surface a bundle of utopian aspirations, entangled with dystopian fears: the apparently rational evidence of the 'ecological footprint' data and targets was translated into a landscape of dilemmas and dissonances, from personal to political.
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Synergy Foresight dimensions
A typical shortcoming of foresight and future studies is a disconnection or mismatch between the process output, and its applications in policy or enterprise -in fact there is often ambiguity and confusion all round. In response, the Synergy-Foresight mapping focuses on synergistic features in four main dimensions -the subject, the process, the agenda and the object. These have similarities to the evaluation of foresight as a 'service encounter' between actors with co-learning and coproduction (Miles, 2012) : and similarities to the Global Futures Intelligence System (GFIS) categories of 'experts', 'information', and 'toolkit' of software and hardware (Glenn, 2012) . These four dimensions are visualized in in Figure 1 and Figure 2 , and each shows a contrast between linear / evolutionary (1.0 and 2.0) models (on the left side of the picture), and the co-evolutionary (3.0) 
Foresight process
Second is a question of 'process': a practical step-by-step method of enquiry and deliberation, suited to the challenge of cognitive complexity. To do this, the Synergy-Foresight method (i.e. 'Synergistic Foresight 3.0') works in a "4S" cycle with four main stages, each with questions to be addressed, and each with practical methods and tools (see www.urban3.net/synergistics/) (Ravetz 2015) . This is broadly similar to a six-stage model of foresight, with linkages to a five-stage policy cycle (Miles 2005 (Miles & 2012 : while the numbers can be discussed, the main point is the circular pattern of enquiry, intention and action. So in the linear / evolutionary model on the left of Figure 1B , the enquiry is generally focused, bounded and specific with its questions and priorities:
• By contrast in the co-evolutionary process model on the right of Figure 1B , at each of the four stages there is a push towards the principles of synergistic co-intelligence. Here we can use a coordinated set of 'co' words. The 'system mapping' stage pushes towards collaborative 'co-learning', on the wider-deeper-longer model above. The 'scenario mapping' stage pushes towards collaborative thinking (i.e. 'co-thinking'), to look beyond immediate trends, towards bigger pictures of change and uncertainty. The third stage, 'synergy mapping', centres on co-creation and co-innovation for system transformation (Lee et al 2012) . And the fourth 'strategy / road-mapping' stage looks at the implications for action, in co-production leading towards co-intelligence. Another way to frame similar notions is with the 'three horizons' which correspond roughly to three levels of coevolutionary change: linear change on a short term horizon: more strategic change on a second Overall this offers a rough mapping of a space of possibilities in normative futures (the diagram here is distilled from many flip-charts on work in progress in many foresight workshops). The mapping at Figure 2A shows again a linear / evolutionary model on the left side: here the 'future' is an image of the present: 'success' is a fixed target or 'winner takes all': and 'change mapping' is a projection of 'more/less of the same.
The co-evolutionary shift on the right hand side then points towards a synergistic model, where 'the future' is a transformation from the seeds of the present: 'success' is a vision for co-evolution:
'failure' is a missed turning on a longer journey. In practice, foresight participants often see such an inter-connected landscape, but struggle to articulate it in a small amount of time. Just sometimes, there is process 'emergence' -workshops which leave the rule book behind, which start buzzing with creative energy and vision, which point directly to the higher purpose of the foresight.
Foresight object
Lastly is the question of the 'object' of the foresight -what is the nature of the problem, system, or 'focal question' to be investigated? Here we draw on the synergistic method and its 'crystal table' visualization, as in Figure 2B . The crystal ball / spherical table is a crude image of a bundle of closely linked sub-systems with an overall metabolic effect. This can't represent every possible problem or issue, but from experience it is a useful way to start a mapping of grand challenges or wicked problems: for instance low-carbon cities, the 'war on drugs', or urban poverty (Ravetz, 2014) . On the left side the 'object' is framed as linear, hierarchical, with a winner-takes-all competition: positive values are extracted by the elite: negative impacts are dumped and externalized. On the right, the 'object' system is co-learning, collaborative, co-creating and co-producing between all actors in all domains: positive outcomes are re-invested, negative impacts are internalized and there are many inter-connections between domains. This model brings great promise but also great challenge, with large 'aspiration' gaps or contradictions as highlighted by stakeholders.
For example, the 'One Planet' urban-regional foresights of 2004-2008, started with a 'trend-target' gap, represented by the carbon and ecological footprint trajectories. In hindsight this seemed to be a technical '1.0' framing of the 'object': in response, policy makers would construct scenarios on a 2.0 adaptive basis, while the citizens and the NGOS would visualize their aspirations for a more synergistic '3.0' model of society, and try to generate policy responses to match (Ravetz, 2006 target (e.g. 'reduce inequality'), and partly as a co-evolutionary pathway (e.g. 'emergence of a sociopolitical paradigm in which inequality is reduced'). More generally there are typical tensions and gaps between the complex aspirations and tacit knowledge of stakeholders, and the need for 'rapid results' with 'indicators' and 'targets'.
INSERT Figure 2: Foresight agenda and object
To sum up so far, this is not to propose that a 3.0 model is 'better' or more advanced than 1.0-2.0 type foresight, as each has a role to play: rather that the 3.0 model may be suited to different kinds of problems, less linear and bounded, and more co-evolutionary and transformational. Another point is that the 3.0 model doesn't replace 1.0 -2.0 versions, it would work better as a parallel and complementary layer.
In practice, urban problems and urban futures are complex and entangled (see the example of housing in Section 4). There is frequent confusion between the internal 'subject-process-object' structure, in that foresight 'subjects' are themselves part of the 'object' and part of the problem, and the 'process' is also dependent on both, and the 'agenda' is also politically driven by the 'subject', which then determines the scope and framing of the 'object'. And so on. The benefit of this kind of mapping is firstly to identify gaps and problems: e.g. where a 3.0 type sponsor is using the wrong method for a 1.0 or 2.0 kind of object. It can also help to identify opportunities: e.g. if the object and subject are clearly a technical 1.0-type frame, then we can go straight ahead: but if one or another are more like 2.0 or 3.0 models, then we can select the methods and tools more effectively. The mapping and visualization shown here aims at greater clarity, and so to more effective action. Table   1 shows a summary version of the 1-2-3.0 co-evolutionary framework, for each of the main foresight components.
INSERT Table 1: Summary of co-evolutionary foresight components
There is an important point on the parallel track of 'visual thinking'. The emergence and transformations above, each call for ways to look beyond conventional, rational, left-brain type 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  e  s  i  g  h  t thinking on a techno-economic axis. We need to consider a range of channels and media to enable better connections with other dimensions of human experience. Visual thinking is not the only way, but it can fit easily with text and rational style thinking and policy processes, and so is strongly recommended for any foresight which aims at more than a 1.0 model (Ravetz, 2011 and 2013) . (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003) . Such questions can be made more visible, by mapping different scenario types across the co-evolutionary framework:
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• linear type (1.0) scenarios: these are basically context, with different trajectories and few inter-connections, with each other or with the normative. For example a 'low carbon 1.0' scenario assumes climate change, technology, economic and political failures.
• adaptive type (2.0) scenarios: these are more about the 'biological' dynamics of competition or adaptation. Then, variations can be explored to make the best of a negative situation, or increase the chances of the positive. For example a 'low carbon 2.0' scenario looks for business opportunities which might change the assumptions of a 1.0 type projection.
• synergistic type (3.0) scenarios: these centre on a more pro-active human agency, and its inter-connections with the context, and the pathways needed to realize the normative goals.
For example: a 'low carbon 3.0' scenario explores the scope for learning, collaboration and shared intelligence, to manage the negative effects and widen the positive.
This mapping also helps to bring into focus the normative, as pictured in Figure 2A . There are many variations on normative visioning, priority choice, 'success scenarios', back-casting, and so on (Bezold, 2009 ). There are common features, in that they aim to define through social processes of deliberation or actualization, a desired collective future, and then to explore ways to achieve it. In practice it's not so difficult to generate normative visions and aspirations: the greater challenge is then to connect them back to current realities. Again there are gaps and dissonances which show up in the scenario components of the city foresights in the next section. A linear (1.0) model of normative 'success' has a frame of 'more of the same', higher GDP growth, larger houses and cars, more shopping and so on. An evolutionary (2.0) model of normative 'success' is more about dynamic conditions or spaces of possibility, e.g. more room for entrepreneurs to succeed, or more chances for communities to innovate. In contrast a co-evolutionary (3.0) model of normative 'success' is more aspirational and often more fuzzy, pointing towards a synergistic society in social, technical, 
Applications to city level foresight
The question is, if cities need foresight thinking as they seem to, why does it so often seem problematic, controversial, and falling short of aspirations? We could start with the variety of 
Boundary issues and tensions
One source of tension is that of 'boundaries' and 'horizons'. For longer term studies (30+ years), the rate of change (structural or paradigm change) -is generally greater than the degree of system stability and coherence. So in technical terms we can't build a model of the system, and we can't trust the existing models: even the concepts behind the models, are suspect beyond 5 years let alone 30. And yet, decisions on infrastructure investment and spatial development are very likely to have long term effects of 30-100+ years. Who might use a urban foresight with 30+ year horizons, and why? For those looking at wider definitions of 'value' and public investment, urban infrastructure will be around for 30-100 years (extending from past trends), but will be fully financed within 20-30 years: therefore the 30-100 year period is more concerned with 'social cultural or ecological value', in the more qualitative area of vision, aspiration, agenda setting etc. So we can gather participants for a long term foresight, but it may not be well connected to real-time investment or policy decisions.
For urban spatial horizons, the conventional definitions of 'the city' aren't always well connected to the reality. Many concepts of the 'urban' are shifting towards the 'global urban system' or 'regional' / 'territorial' ... (and in many cases including 'rural'). It could be argued that the focus on the conventional 'city' (assuming this as a clear specific thing), is actually misleading, if it distracts attention from other significant levels of spatial activity: the peri-urban, metro-scape, tax-haven enclave, 'aerotropolis', and so on (Piorr et al, 2011) .
In technical terms, why is the 'urban' system less modelled and analysed than others such as energy and emissions? It could be that energy is more focused on its core technical systems which are more 'tractable': so when an energy study looks at fuzzy, controversial, socio-political issues, it can still build on solid foundations in physics and engineering. In contrast, there are many attempts at a 'science of cities', focused on physical systems of landuse, buildings and infrastructure (Batty, 2014): but these tend to downplay other qualities and transition effects, such as social-cultural change, work-home relationships, community-household, lifestyle-network, and so on. For such qualitative relational systems shaped by human cognition and collaboration, technical modelling needs better connections with other methods, which are more suited to 'cognitive-collaborative-complexity' and the synergistic approach (Ravetz, in press ).
Urban policy and sectoral applications:
Urban systems are subsets of national / global systems, often picking up problems caused at other levels: so there are issues of agency, displacement, split incentives etc. But this raises political and ethical questions. For instance, the current response to the credit crunch / financial deficit in the UK Similar questions apply for each of the main urban policy sectors. We can identify the sectors most involved with the long-term strategic approach: demographics, spatial planning, housing and community, urban infrastructure, public services, environment and ecosystems, and so on. Table 2 shows a summary of the co-evolutionary 1-2-3.0 perspective on 'strategic urban intelligence' for each sector, which were variously taken up in the case studies to follow. • other recent futures / foresight type exercises in GM and the various policy organizations which have flourished there;
• Consultations on the application of the scenarios to 'transitions' and 'pathways' in key sectors including energy, transport, housing;
• Visual thinking was a continuing strand through the project as above;
• A spin-off project 'Generation 2040' involved young people at the local college, and contributed a powerful statement of aspiration, as above.
With a range of future drivers and possibilities on the table, the main questions emerged: what were the collective 'ambitions' of GM? And how, in the face of uncertainty and challenge, could they be achieved? For this a 'success scenario' was co-produced, to explore what is 'preferable and plausible' for the wider community of GM. The final step was to look for the bigger picture: to test the ambitions against uncertainties and challenges, and map out strategic 'pathways' towards success, as directions of travel, opportunity and synergies. These pathways bring to the surface some underlying qualities, as in Section 2: resilience by community co-production: creative policy coinnovation: social co-learning and collaboration: anticipatory collaborative governance, and general urban policy co-intelligence.
The implication is that, whichever way the 'Devo' agenda goes, GM has great potential to be a leader F o r e s i g h t thinking and co-intelligence, with a more embedded and continuous foresight program, generating strategic linkages into policy, business and civil society.
Newcastle City Futures
Here the civic agenda starts with the city's peripheral location, with high levels of dependency and vulnerability of the regional economy. City-region collaboration between neighbouring authorities is not simple, however there are close bonds and a very effective 'triple helix' ecosystem within the city itself.
Newcastle City Futures examines significant architectural and planning projects that have shaped and reshaped the city in the latter half of the 20th century and continue to do so in the 21st century.
There was positive cross-sector collaboration in a city which is focused on modernity and change, and the result was an exemplary programme of events including an exhibition, public forums, educational initiatives and sector studies, jointly hosted by Newcastle University and its partners, as on www.newcastlecityfutures.org . The overall aim was to start a 'big city conversation' and engage all sectors in debates about the city's future (Tewdwr-Jones, 2014).
A year on from this initiative, questions can be raised on the overall effect and value added. It seems well received as a civic contribution: however the results then feed into a real-time and more complex game, of access to external funding, landholdings and development prospects, changing government policy on 'City Deals' and devolution, and general strategies for survival in an age of harsh austerity.
Cardiff 2050:
Issues in Cardiff start with urban regeneration and the effects of gentrification: and the city's role as the capital of Wales, a partly autonomous 'devolved administration', with strong national culture and weak national politics. There are familiar urban problems of growth and congestion, alongside post-industrial restructuring, inequality and dependency, with much deprivation concentrated in the Valleys to the north of the city. However Cardiff and its region have a visible commitment to sustainable development and a low carbon / One Planet future (Ravetz, 2007) : and the Welsh Assembly Government's recent Bill on 'sustainable development' is one of the most advanced anywhere. 
Reading 2050:
The city of Reading, a major hub on the west side of Greater London, is one of the most prosperous in the UK, with strengths in hi-tech and digital industries, innovation and inward investment. The urban issues here are more about growth and congestion: urban containment and quality of life, and growing inequalities in the urban system. self-reliant green city (Dixon and Cohen, 2015) .It seems (at the time of writing) that this programme was successfully integrated into Reading's strategic planning and related activities.
Implications of the city demonstrations
Each of these four examples has focused on the 'city vision', as a co-created common concept, with the aspiration to uniting different sections in the city system. Applying the co-evolutionary framework and the foresight dimensions from Section 2, some key questions come up with 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r e s i g h t 'subject co-evolution' strand of our framework: i.e. where the sponsors / agents / providers / users of the foresight are themselves co-evolving, co-learning, co-processing and cocreating capacity for an urban co-intelligence . b) How to resolve competing visions? For example, GM centred on one success scenario, where (arguably) underlying tensions were not resolved. Newcastle focused more on local practical visions for actual sites and infrastructure. Reading and Cardiff used alternative scenarios on the positive aspiration side, but said little about negative forces. This is a challenge for the 'process co-evolution' strand of the framework: i.e. where the foresight method needs to find ways of exploring and managing structural problems, controversies, dilemmas and hard choices. c) How to focus the vision on structural change and reform? The Manchester case for instance, raised the challenges of inequalities, alienation, fragmentation etc: but was not able within the foresight, to follow up the debate or mobilize action in any meaningful way. This is a challenge for the 'agenda co-evolution' strand of the framework: i.e. that to mobilize the vision involves co-evolutionary change in the wider urban economy, society, infrastructure, and spatial form. 
WAYS FORWARD: Towards a City Foresight Platform
In almost every urban foresight exercise there is a common response from participants, that the information is all fragmented: that simple policies don't work with complex needs: that government Page 21 of 38 Foresight   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r e s i g h t silos produce short term fixes. This suggests the benefit of applying the co-evolutionary framework outlined above, for some practical ways forward.
For this we put up a proposition for 'the possibility of a City Foresight Platform'. We envisage this on two main tracks: a human system of co-learning and collaboration, and a technical system of information management and exchange. Such a 'platform', 'hub, exchange or network, would aim to promote and support 'strategic policy intelligence', at the local / city / region scale. As a continuous resource library and deliberation programme, it would also enable one-off major enquiries on the foresight model. Overall it would provide a kind of arena for co-intelligence and strategic 'anticipatory governance', which can take a forward look, mobilize the resources of all actors, and respond better to complex problems.
There are many possible approaches and platform models, in a fast developing field, as described by others (Konig and Evans, 2013: Hendriks, 2012) . Here the aim is to identify some fundamental principles for the scope and potential of such a platform, and the synergistic method is a useful guide to looking beyond conventional boundaries:
-'wider', with inter-connections of actors: with ways to bring together and generate collaborative action between different groups and organizations, sectors and supply chains.
Example models are the 'triple helix', civic university, urban forums, urban rooms, living labs, open data platforms:
-'deeper', with integration of alternative domains and value systems: we look for linking actions between value systems: e.g. social, technical, economic, environmental, political, or cultural. Examples include café scientifique, city visions, community design and similar.
-'longer' horizons of change and transformation: from direct short term trend projections, towards medium term evolution of markets or policies, all the way to a longer term coevolutionary transformation of whole socio-technical systems.
To mobilize these synergies needs enablers, creative spaces, catalysts, inter-mediaries, boundaryspanners, civic entrepreneurs,cultural ambassadors, or other 'change agents'. Such enablers will encourage inter-connections of many kinds: innovation, experimentation, prototyping, visioning, design thinking and so on. The City Foresight Platform can play the role of a laboratory, arena, forum, hub, exchange, incubator, or 'sand-pit'. In each there are opportunities to enable ideas and collaborations and synergies and prototypes, in order to grow, emerge, develop, cultivate, flourish, adapt or reproduce. Many such laboratories or platforms exist in many places, but now we are looking to step up a gear.
We can look beyond the 'inter-connections of things', as in current versions of Living Labs, City Labs or Futures Labs. We can look towards a Platform model which is more about the 'inter-connections of thinking', for a more co-evolutionary kind of social learning and synergistic collaboration.
The Platform's futures perspective stretches from the citizen visions and aspirations, to technical modelling and forecasting. We find that 'the future' is most interesting when it's challenging and controversial: visions can explore the cracks and contradictions in ideologies: system models should
aim to demonstrate what we don't know: and technical forecasts can explore uncertainties. Where short term change and turbulence reduces 'the future' to just a few months (as in the UK in 2016), the Platform adjusts its focus to a shorter term resilience and resources to manage change. At the time of writing a prototype platform is being developed in partnership with the GM policymakers, as a follow-on to the GM2040 programme. This is an application of the GM Devolution programme, and aims to demonstrate a 'triple helix' collaboration between public, private and academic sectors. It calls for improved capacity in foresight and the 'urban co-intelligence' capacity for co-learning and co-innovation between all parts of society (Figure 4 ). This is currently taking shape as work in progress, as follows:
-Linear model ('Retrofit 1.0'): low-carbon retrofit is mainly focused on numbers of housing units, megawatts and tonnes of carbon, or measures of poverty and deprivation.
-Evolutionary model ('Retrofit 2.0'): low-carbon retrofit is focused on the operation of the market with incentives and surpluses, barriers or failures. It also looks at behavior change, policy analysis, professional roles, industry supply chains and so on, with insights from the evolutionary social sciences.
-Co-evolutionary model ('Retrofit 3.0): low carbon retrofit mapping and analysis takes all the above on board, and then looks at the potential for co-learning, co-processing, co-creation and co-production, in bridging institutional gaps and market failures. Markets in housing or energy are not assumed to be autonomous invisible-hand processes, but more like reflexive, learning, collaborative and deliberative entities. Likewise the policy process and social process opportunities revolve around urban co-intelligence and energy co-intelligence, with full range of inter-connections to related issues such as poverty and the welfare system, construction and skills, infrastructure and spatial planning, social innovation and behavior change.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper draws from personal experience of foresight processes at the city or city-region level. We present an outline framework and methodology which has emerged from this experience, with wide applications. We review the recent experience in the UK Foresight for Future of Cities: explore the scope and 'possibility of a City Foresight Platform': and sketch a current prototype in Greater
Manchester as work in progress. Overall there are no forecasts or guaranteed models. We live in an age of flux and uncertainty, where many assumptions are giving way, with systemic transformations in urban economies, communities, governments, technologies and cultures. At the same time, we're in an age of crunches and crisis points and 'grand societal challenges': cities are the locus for conflict, within and between local and global: on environment and climate, cultural differences, social inequalities or financial vulnerabilities. In contrast we need to look for more dynamic processes, value-driven and entrepreneurial on both micro and macro scales. In this the role of foresight can be crucial. Again we look beyond traditional 'BOGSAT' ('bunch of guys sat around a table') models of foresight, towards something which is more fluid, responsive, reflexive, networked and open-ended. In this it could aim to ride some of the current waves: social technology, economic co-production, eco-cultural enterprise, participatory
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